In this paper we analyze, mainly in a nitary setting, the consis- 
Introduction
Real world decisions often happen to be taken about facts which are not quite well specied. Consider, for instance, an investor who decides to buy (or to sell) a nancial asset at a certain price because he is told that, very likely, the asset will guarantee (or will not guarantee) a good yield in one year's time.
We pinpoint three facts about this example:
(a) the sentence S, the asset will guarantee a good yield in one year's time, does not represent an event, because of its linguistic indeterminacy, due to the word good ; * Dipartimento di Matematica Applicata B. de Finetti, University of Trieste, Piazzale Europa 1, I-34127 Trieste, Italy. Email: paolo.vicig@econ.units.it (b) the uncertainty evaluation of S is quite rough: S appears to be very likely;
(c) in spite of the intrinsic vagueness of points (a) and (b), the investor may be willing to pay a (non vague, but) certain price to buy the asset.
Since decisional situations similar to the investor example do occur in practice, it is important to study some modelisation which may reasonably closely interpret them.
Fuzzy set theory provides a conceptual framework for (a): given a partition (or universe of discourse) Ω (i.e. a set of pairwise disjoint events, whose union is the sure event), a map F : Ω→[0, 1] measures the degree of compatibility of each element of Ω with the concept represented by S.
Clearly Ω should be related to S, usually because its elements are described by propositions of (classical) logic which solve in alternative ways the indeterminacy in S. In our example, one such proposition could be the asset guarantees an annual gain strictly between 3% and 4% of its buying price.
The map F identies the fuzzy event S, and is also commonly called fuzzy event. We shall often follow this convention too.
If further a (normal) possibility distribution π is given on Ω, a way of tackling (b) is to measure the uncertainty of S (or F ) by the fuzzy possibility Π f dened, following Zadeh [24] , as Π f (F ) = sup ω∈Ω min{π(ω), F (ω)} . As for point (c), fuzzy set theory does not relate Π f (F ) with the asset buying or selling price, not explaining if and how a given value of Π f (F ) determines it, or more generally the investor's behavior.
Behavioral interpretations of uncertainty evaluations are on the contrary well-developed in the theory of imprecise probabilities [16] , where the consistency notions of avoiding sure loss (weaker) and coherence (stronger) are applied to upper (and lower) previsions. We shall say more about this approach in section 2.
One link between the two theories is the fact that when F ∈ {0, 1}, F is the membership function (or indicator) of an (ordinary) event in the powerset P(Ω) of Ω, and Π f (F ) = Π(F ) is a possibility mathematically, a supremum preserving function. A possibility Π is a special instance of upper prevision, and is coherent if and only if its restriction on Ω, the possibility distribution π = Π| Ω , is normal, which means sup ω∈Ω {π(ω)} = 1 [4, 17] .
Normal possibilities have several interesting properties within the theory of imprecise probabilities [17, 19, 10] ; in particular we shall be concerned in section 3 with some less known closure properties of theirs, i.e. such that In this paper we analyze the behavioral interpretation of fuzzy possibilities as upper previsions in a nitary setting, i.e. referring to a nite partition Ω, showing that they avoid sure loss but are not coherent, apart from a special case, and determining their natural extension, i.e. their least committal correction to a coherent upper prevision. This is done in section 4, while in section 5 we answer the same questions for a generalization of (1.1), called fuzzy Tpossibility, where min is replaced by a Tnorm (or more generally by a seminorm). Interestingly, it turns out that the generalization does not aect the natural extension, which remains the same (cf. theorem 5.1 (c)). Also, fuzzy possibilities have the closure properties of possibilities, and this fact seems to depend on the continuity of min. In fact, we show that fuzzy Tpossibilities have these properties when T is a continuous norm, not necessarily otherwise.
The following interpretation of fuzzy possibilities and Tpossibilities is also relevant and will be exploited in the paper: since a map F : Ω→ [0, 1] corresponds, in probabilistic language, to a random variable (or gamble, according to [16] ), given a possibility Π on P(Ω) and considering the set F = F(Ω) of all random variables in [0, 1], (1.1) or also any fuzzy Tpossibility are special types of extensions of Π onto F. More specically, they are extensions by means of fuzzy integrals. The question of extending coherent upper probabilities using fuzzy integrals was tackled also in [2, 3] . We say more on this in the later section 5.1. Section 6 contains concluding remarks.
Preliminaries
This section is mainly a concise presentation of some aspects of the theory of imprecise probabilities. A much more extended discussion is in [16] ; see also [18] for a shorter online presentation.
Although the term imprecise probabilities is currently prevailing, the theory in [16] actually deals with imprecise (upper or lower) previsions, which are (imprecise) uncertainty evaluations for bounded random variables. An imprecise probability for an event A is a special case of upper prevision where the random variable is the indicator of A, I(A), i.e. the random variable which is 1 when A is true, 0 when A is false.
In [16] , following and extending an approach which goes back to [7] , imprecise previsions are given a behavioral interpretation in terms of betting schemes. The upper (lower) prevision P (X) (P (X)) an agent assigns to a (bounded) random number X is his/her inmum selling price (supremum buying price) for X. Since selling X is equivalent to buying −X, we may focus on upper previsions only (P (X) = −P (−X)).
In other words, given P (X), the agent is willing to accept the bet which (as he receives at least P (X) for selling X) guarantees him the uncertain gain G(X) = P (X) − X, which might possibly be negative for some values of X. It is however unreasonable that sup G < 0, because this would cause a sure loss to the agent, if the selling price is suciently close to P (X). Further, if the agent nds P (X) − X acceptable, and has a linear utility scale, he should nd s(P (X) − X) acceptable too, ∀ s ≥ 0.
A generalization of this idea leads to the consistency notion of avoiding sure loss for an upper prevision P : D→R, where D is an arbitrary set of bounded random numbers. Denition 2.1. Given P : D→R, P is an upper prevision that avoids sure loss if and only However, avoiding sure loss is too mild a consistency notion. For instance, it does not necessarily require P (X) ≤ sup X, nor does it require monotonicity. Although special cases of previsions that avoid sure loss, with certain additional properties, may correspond to interesting models [11] , the stronger coherence condition is usually preferable. Denition 2.2. Given P : D→R, P is a coherent upper prevision if
We refer to [16] for a behavioral interpretation of coherence. Possibility measures, plausibility functions, 2-alternating probabilities are special cases of coherent upper (probabilities, and hence) previsions [16, 17] .
A coherent precise prevision P on D is a map P : D→R that satises the modied version of denition 2.1 where s 1 , . . . , s n ≥ 0 is replaced by s 1 , . . . , s n ∈ R [7] , and is a special case of both upper and lower coherent prevision [16] .
Remark 2.1. Although its denition does not involve any probability distribution, the notion of precise prevision is equivalent to that of expectation (a proof may be found in [6] ).
In particular, we shall be concerned in theorem 4.1 with precise previsions on the set F of all mappings from Ω = {ω 1 , . . . , ω k } into [0, 1] . Since, for i = 1, . . . , k, the indicator function I(ω i ) of ω i belongs to F, and its prevision P (I(ω i )) is simply the probability of ω i , any precise prevision P on F uniquely determines a probability on Ω, i.e. a probability vector (p 1 , . . . , p k ) such that p i = P (I(ω i )) is the probability of ω i . Conversely, given a probability vector (p 1 , . . . , p k ) on Ω, a coherent precise prevision P on F is determined by computing, ∀ F ∈ F, its expectation E(F ) = k i=1 p i F (ω i ) and putting P (F ) = E(F ). Clearly, P extends (p 1 , . . . , p k ) on F, and is further its unique extension on F to a coherent precise prevision.
Previsions that avoid sure loss and coherent previsions are characterized indirectly using precise previsions: Theorem 2.1. Given P : D→R, (a) P is an upper prevision that avoids sure loss if and only if P dominates a coherent precise prevision
(b) (Upper envelope theorem) P is a coherent upper prevision if and only
where M is some non-empty set of coherent precise previsions (sup is attained). P is called the upper envelope of M.
Another fundamental concept in the theory is that of natural extension, dened in [16] . In our framework, it is sucient to recall that the natural extension E on D of an upper prevision which avoids sure loss on D (is always nite and) is its least-committal correction to a coherent upper prevision on D. This follows from (c) in the next theorem, which collects some properties of the natural extension to be used later. Theorem 2.2. Given P : D→R, suppose that P avoids sure loss and let M * be the set of all coherent precise probabilities dominated by P on D. Then (a) the natural extension E of P is given by E(X) = max P ∈M * {P (X)}, ∀ X ∈ D, and M * (P ) = M * (E); (b) P is coherent if and only if P = E; (c) if P * is a coherent upper prevision dominated by P , then
Note in particular that (a) is a characterization of the natural extension in [16] , but can be taken as its denition in our framework.
Closure properties of possibilities
We recall that given a (not necessarily nite) partition Ω, Π : Possibility measures have been studied in a number of dierent theories, in particular fuzzy set theory (some general references include [8] and [20] ), and, more recently, imprecise probability theory.
Within the theory of imprecise probabilities, a possibility is viewed as an instance of upper prevision, and is coherent if and only if it is normal [4, 17] ; nonnormal possibilities incur sure loss, as is easy to verify.
Although a possibility is a rather special case of upper prevision, when Its upper envelope Π * , dened by Π * (A) = sup γ∈Γ {Π γ (A)}, ∀ A ∈ P(Ω), is a possibility measure on P(Ω).
Proof. Follows easily from supremum preserving properties of possibility measures, cf. (3.1).
Proposition 3.2. Let {Π n } n∈N + be a sequence of possibility measures on
where Ω is not necessarily nite, that converges uniformly to a function Π. Then Π is a possibility measure.
Proof. We prove rst that the limit function π of the sequence {π n } (π n is the possibility distribution of Π n ) is a possibility distribution. In fact, since 0 ≤ π n (ω) ≤ 1, ∀ n ∈ N + , π is nonnegative and sup ω∈Ω {π(ω)} ≤ 1.
We show that actually sup ω∈Ω {π(ω)} = 1. Since the convergence of {π n } is uniform,
Therefore the following inequalities hold for n ≥ n (suprema are performed over all ω ∈ Ω)
To complete the proof, we have to show that (3.1) holds. In fact, Π n (A)→ sup ω∈A {π(ω)} and its convergence is uniform, because
where the last inequality follows from the uniform convergence of {π n } to π, that is from (3.2).
On the other hand, from the theorem assumptions Π n (A)→ Π(A), ∀ A ∈ P(Ω). Hence, (3.1) follows from uniqueness of the limit. Proposition 3.3. (Pointwise convergence) Let {Π n } n∈N + be a sequence of possibility measures on P(Ω) which converges pointwise to a function Π on P(Ω), i.e. Π n (A)→Π(A), ∀ A ∈ P(Ω). Then Π is a possibility measure if Ω is nite, while this is not necessarily true when Ω is innite.
Proof. If Ω is nite, the assumption follows from proposition 3.2, recalling that uniform and pointwise convergence are then equivalent.
We give now an example where Ω is innite and Π is no possibility: let Ω = {ω 1 , . . . , ω j , . . .} and consider the sequence of 01 valued possibility distributions {π n } n∈N + , where π n (ω j ) = 1 if j = n, π n (ω j ) = 0 if j = n.
The sequence of possibility measures {Π n } induced by {π n } converges pointwise to a limit function Π which is no possibility, because (3.1) does not hold. In fact 1 = Π(Ω) > sup j∈N + {π(ω j )} = 0, where π = lim n→∞ π n . 
4.1
Fuzzy possibilities, coherence, and natural extension
Since Ω = {ω 1 , . . . , ω k } in this section, (1.1) reduces to
The basic result for analyzing consistency of Π f is the following theorem, which characterizes the set of (coherent) precise previsions dominated by
Theorem 4.1. Let Π f be a fuzzy possibility, dened by (4.1). Dene
The set M(Π f ) of coherent precise previsions dominated by Π f on F is characterized as follows:
Proof. We preliminarily recall (cf. Remark 2.1) that a (coherent) precise prevision P on F is uniquely identied by a probability vector (p 1 , . . . , p k ) on Ω, so that we can write p i = P (I(ω i )).
Given this, consider P such that p i = P (I(ω i )) > 0 if and only if i ∈ I Π (there are such precise previsions, because normality of π guarantees that there exists j ∈ {1, . . . , k} such that π(ω j ) = 1, i.e. I Π is non-empty).
We show that P is dominated by Π f (F ), and therefore belongs to
Conversely, let P be a precise prevision such that, for some j, p j = P (I(ω j )) > 0 and j / ∈ I Π . Then P does not belong to M(Π f ). To see this, suppose for notational ease that π(ω 1 ) = 1, π(ω 2 ) = π 2 < 1, and p 2 > 0. Consider F ∈ F such that F (ω 2 ) = 1 and F (ω i ) = π 2 for i = 2. Since min{π(ω 1 ), F (ω 1 )} = min{π(ω 2 ), F (ω 2 )} = π 2 and min{π(ω i ), F (ω i )} ≤ π 2 for i > 2, we obtain Π f (F ) = π 2 . Then
We may thus state that the set M(Π f ) is characterized by (4.3).
Corollary 4.2. If π is unimodal, the cardinality of M(Π f ) is one.
We shall also need the following denition, before turning to consistency properties of Π f . Therefore Π f avoids sure loss by theorem 2.1 (a).
To prove the remaining part of the theorem, we prove (equivalently, by theorem 2.1 (b)) that Π f is the upper envelope of the set M(Π f ) if and only if it is noncomparative. Let Π f be noncomparative. Then Π f (F ) = max i∈I Π {F (ω i )}. Now let F ∈ F, and suppose that Π f (F ) = F (ω j ). The precise prevision P * generated by the probability vector (p 1 , . . . , p k ) with p j = 1, p i = 0 for i = j (belongs to M(Π f ) and) is such that P * (F ) = F (ω j ) = Π f (F ). Clearly, any other prevision in M(Π f ) is dominated by Π f by theorem 4.1. Therefore Π f is the upper envelope of M(Π f ).
Vice versa, let Π f be a comparative fuzzy possibility. Hence there exists π j = π(ω j ) such that 0 < π j < 1. Let 0 ≤ f < π j , and consider the following F * ∈ F:
from which follows that Π f is not the upper envelope of M(Π f ) on F, hence it is not coherent. 
Proof. By theorem 2.2 (a) it is sucient to show that E Π f (F ) is the upper envelope of the set M(Π f ). To do that, choose F ∈ F. Whatever is P ∈ M(Π f ),
Further, equality is achieved above for some P ∈ M(Π f ). In fact, let max i∈I Π {F (ω i )} = F (ω j ) and consider the precise prevision P * generated by the probability vector (p 1 , . . . , p k ), where p j = 1, p i = 0 for i = j. Then P * belongs to M(Π f ), and P * (F ) = i∈I Π p i F (ω i ) = F (ω j ).
Comment. A fuzzy possibility is generally not coherent, but avoids sure loss. Its natural extension E has a rather simple expression. Loosely speaking, E is a sort of defuzzication, as it takes account only of those events in Ω which have possibility one (i.e., the most likely ones), and among them chooses the one(s) most compatible with F (having the maximum F (·)). 
is a fuzzy possibility.
(b) Let Ω be nite and let {Π n f } n∈N + be a sequence of fuzzy possibilities on F(Ω) which converges pointwise to Π f on F, i.e. Π n f (F )→Π f (F ), ∀ F ∈ F. Then Π f is a fuzzy possibility.
Proof. We preliminarily observe that the restriction Π f | F 0,1 of a fuzzy possibility Π f to the set F 0,1 of all binary (01 valued) F ∈ F is an ordinary possibility on P(Ω).
Proof of (a). Since {Π f γ | F 0,1 } γ∈Γ is a family of ordinary possibility measures, its upper envelope is a possibility by proposition 3.1. In particular Π f * (ω) = π * (ω) is a possibility distribution on Ω. Hence we have to prove To obtain (4.6), consider a monotone sequence π γn (ω) ↑ sup γ∈Γ {π γ (ω)}.
Then we get, using the sequence's monotonicity at the second equality and continuity of f (x, y) = min(x, y), f : R 2 →R, a well known real analysis result (see, for instance, [12] ), at the third equality:
Using also (4.6), we obtain then (4.5) as follows:
Proof of (b). Proposition 3.3 guarantees that
is an ordinary possibility measure. Hence π = lim n→∞ π n is a possibility distribution on Ω. We have to show now that (4.1) holds for Π f .
From continuity of minimum and the convergence assumption we get, ∀ ω ∈ Ω, min{π n (ω), F (ω)}→ min{π(ω), F (ω)}, and using also continuity of maximum
It follows that:
max ω∈Ω min{π(ω), F (ω)} and uniqueness of the limit gives then (4.1).
A generalization of fuzzy possibilities
It is natural in fuzzy set theory to replace the minimum operator with a more general one, often a T-norm (see for instance [9, 22] ). We shall do that too, considering now a fuzzy T-possibility, dened by
where T is a T-norm, and answering the same questions raised in section 4. Again, we call non-comparative a fuzzy T-possibility generated by a {0, 1}
valued possibility distribution.
Denition 5.1. We recall that a triangular norm or Tnorm is a mapping
Clearly, every Tnorm is also a Tseminorm. Further, it is easy to verify that properties (a'),
where (5.2) where I Π is dened in (4.2) and E Π f is the natural extension of Π f , the fuzzy T-possibility with T = min. Further, if Π T is noncomparative it is coherent.
Proof. To prove (a), recall that the set T of all T-norms has a maximal and a minimal element, which means in our framework that ∀ T ∈ T, ∀ω, ∀(π(ω), F (ω)),
where Z is the drastic product dened by
We prove now that 5) whatever is the given possibility distribution π (Π Z is the fuzzy T-possibility where T is the drastic product Z).
In fact, putting
Using also proposition 4.4, we obtain now (5.5), ∀ F ∈ F:
There exists F ∈ F which makes the inequality strict in (5.5). In fact, since
Apply now the maximum operator in (5.3) and use (5.5) to get
These inequalities tell us that Π T is dominated by Π f (F ), but dominates strictly at least for one F , as seen above the natural extension of Π f (F ). Therefore Π T cannot be coherent: if it were so, this would contradict theorem 2.2 (c), applied to the natural extension E Π f (F ).
Proof of (b): Π T dominates E Π f , which (being coherent) avoids sure loss and therefore dominates some coherent precise prevision P by theorem 2.1 (a); Π T then dominates P and hence avoids sure loss, again by theorem 2.1 (a).
Proof of (c):
) be the set of coherent precise previsions dominated by Π T (by E Π f , by Π f ). From (5.7) and theorem 2.2,
To complete the proof of the theorem, let now Π T be noncomparative. It is easy to see then that Π Z (F ) = Π f (F ), ∀F ∈ F (for instance, using (5.6)). Since applying the maximum operator over all ω ∈ Ω to the members of (5.3) we get, ∀ F ∈ F,
(incidentally, note that (5.8) holds also for a comparative Π T ), all Tnorms are equal to Π f in the noncomparative case. Coherence of Π T follows then from proposition 4.3.
Discussion
There are several points which deserve some discussion at this stage.
(a) Generalization to fuzzy Tseminorms. Although we presented the generalization (5.1) of (1.1) where min is replaced by a Tnorm, theorem 5.1 still holds if min is more generally replaced by a Tseminorm (denition 5.1). In fact, the key inequalities (5.3) apply also when T (π(ω), F (ω)) is a Tseminorm, as is easily veried using (a') and (e) of denition 5.1.
Further, the inequalities (5.8) hold too, ∀ F ∈ F and for a given π. This means that replacing min with a Tseminorm in (5.1) provides us with a better (while still not coherent, in the comparative case) evaluation, in the sense that it is closer to its leastcommittal coherent correction, the natural extension (5.2). In this view, the drastic product is preferable among all Tseminorms.
(b) Fuzzy Tpossibilities as fuzzy integrals. A fuzzy Tpossibility is a way of extending a possibility (a special case of coherent upper probability) from P(Ω) to F(Ω). A fuzzy Tpossibility is also an instance of fuzzy integral, as dened in [3] (generalizing Sugeno's original denition [15] ; other generalizations include those in [14] and [21] ). According to this denition, given a bounded measurable non-negative map X, X : Ω→R + , a map T : R + × R + →R + satisfying (d) and (e) of denition 5.1 and a possibility measure Π on P(Ω), the fuzzy integral of X with respect to Π is
When T is the algebraic product, (5.9) reduces to the Shilkret integral [13] .
Under the assumptions of theorem 5.1, (5.10) as follows from results in [5] or, more directly, from [3] , proof of eq. (10), recalling that any Tnorm on a nite set is completely distributive with respect to supremum. Extensions of coherent upper probabilities and of possibilities using the fuzzy integral (5.9) are investigated in [2, 3] , and our work therefore relates closely to these papers. In particular, part (a) of theorem 5.1 follows from general results in [2, 3] ; however, our proof is dierent and is instrumental for determining the natural extension E Π T , a question which is not tackled in [2, 3] .
We incidentally note also that the fact that when the given Π is non comparative all Tseminorms coincide is again in accordance with a more general result in [2, 3] , stating that when a fuzzy integral is coherent, it is equal to the Shilkret integral.
(c) Properties of fuzzy Tpossibilities. An arbitrary upper prevision P which avoids sure loss but is not coherent may have some unpleasant features, like lack of internality or of monotonicity. Fuzzy Tpossibilities avoid some of these shortcomings, in particular it is easy to verify that
As for the closure properties of fuzzy Tpossibilities, they are not guaranteed for every Tnorm, but continuity of T is a sucient condition for them to hold. This ensues from the next proposition and the subsequent example.
Proposition 5.2. (a) Let P Γ = {Π T γ } γ∈Γ be a given family of fuzzy T possibilities on F(Ω), where Ω is arbitrary. If T is continuous, the upper envelope Π * T of P Γ , Π * T (F ) = sup γ∈Γ {Π T γ (F )}, ∀ F ∈ F, is a fuzzy Tpossibility.
(b) Let Ω be nite and let {Π n T } n∈N + be a sequence of fuzzy T-possibilities on F(Ω), which converges pointwise to a function
Proof. The restriction Π T | F 0,1 of a fuzzy Tpossibility Π T to the set F 0,1 of all 0-1 valued F ∈ F is just an ordinary possibility. In fact, let F ∈ F 0,1 . When F (ω) = 0, T (π(ω), F (ω)) = 0 by (e) in denition 5.1, when F (ω) = 1, T (π(ω), F (ω)) = 1 by (a') in denition 5.1. Therefore Π T (F ) = max ω∈Ω {T (π(ω), F (ω))} = max ω∈A {π(ω)}, where A is the event in P(Ω) made up of those ω such that F (ω) = 1 (if F ≡ 0, A = ∅ and Π T (∅) = 0 is assumed).
Proof of (a). From what just noted above and proposition
The proof is then analogous to that of proposition 4.5 (a), using continuity of T instead of continuity of min.
Proof of (b). Similarly to (a), note rst that Π n T | F 0,1 is a possibility, hence π(ω) = lim n→∞ Π n T | F 0,1 (ω), ∀ ω ∈ Ω, is a possibility distribution by propo- From this, and since lim n→∞ π n (ω i ) = 1, ∀ ω i ∈ X, Π Z (F ) = F (ω 1 ) < max 
Conclusions
Fuzzy possibilities may be seen as a way of extending ordinary possibilities to upper previsions, and may therefore be interpreted as upper previsions themselves. From this, it is natural to investigate their consistency properties within the wellestablished theory of imprecise probabilities (previsions). This kind of analysis seems necessary if we wish to give a behavioural explanation to the usage of tools from fuzzy set theory in a number of practical decision problems, like the one mentioned in the Introduction.
It turns out that fuzzy possibilities satisfy the weaker consistency requirement of avoiding sure loss, but generally not the stronger coherence condition, hence they are a weakly consistent model in this framework.
However they preserve some closure properties of ordinary possibilities, and it is possible to correct them to coherent evaluations using the natural extension, which we determine explicitly.
It is also natural to generalize fuzzy possibilities replacing min with a T(semi)norm in their denition. This does not alter the consistency properties, and the natural extension remains the same too, while it appears that the closure properties hold when T is continuous, not necessarily otherwise. Among all T(semi)norms, the drastic product Z is the closest to the natural extension, while min behaves in the opposite way. However we saw that the closure properties do not hold for Z. Hence no T(semi)norm appears to be uniformly preferable, but any continuous one performs at least as well as min.
Finally, when viewing fuzzy Tpossibilities as instances of fuzzy integrals, this paper may be seen as a further contribution to prior work on the consistency of fuzzy integrals as imprecise previsions.
